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Abstract. We propose a leakage-resilient signature scheme in the con-
tinual leakage model that is based on a well-known identity-based en-
cryption scheme by Boneh and Boyen (Eurocrypt 2004). The proposed
signature scheme is the most eﬃcient among the existing schemes that
allow for continual leakage. Its eﬃciency is close to that of non leakage-
resilient pairing-based signature schemes. It tolerates leakage of almost
half of the bits of the secret key at every new signature invocation. We
prove the security of the new scheme in the generic bilinear group model.
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1 Introduction
Side channel attacks are often eﬀective in recovering the secret key of cryp-
tosystems that are provably secure otherwise [16,17,7]. Typical examples
of side channel attacks include analysis of running-time, power consump-
tion, electromagnetic radiation leak, fault detection, to name just but a
few. Countermeasures adopted in practice against side channel attacks are
usually heuristic, aimed often at covering a restricted class of attacks. On
the other hand, it is desirable to extend the traditional provable security
methodology to also include side channel attacks. This area of contempo-
rary cryptography is usually referred to as leakage-resilient cryptography
and it has been an increasingly active area in recent years.
In this work we make two main assumptions to model leakage:
 Bounded leakage: the useful leakage data per signature invocation
is bounded in length (but unbounded overall);
 Independent leakage: the computation can be divided into rounds,
where each such round leaks independently.
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This model has been previously used in [11,21,15,12]. The ﬁrst assump-
tion can be seen overly restrictive; however it should be noticed that in
practice many side-channel attacks only exploit a polylogarithmic amount
of information. The second assumption allows us to divide the memory of
a device, at every computing step, into two parts - an active and a passive
part. The part of the memory being currently accessed by a computation
is the active part, and only the active part leaks information at any given
time. We stress that even if our leakage deﬁnition is local with respect
to each part of the memory, it still captures some global functions of the
secret key, for instance any aﬃne leakage function. We refer to the work
by Dziembowski and Faust [10] for a discussion on the signiﬁcance and
limitations of this leakage model. In particular, the Only Computation
Leaks Information model [13,20] complies with our leakage model.
In the last few years a tremendous progress has been made in the inter-
play between provable security and side-channel attacks, such as the works
[14,12,6,8,18,5] bear witness for the case of digital signatures. Admittedly,
the schemes that do not use any idealized assumption (random oracle,
generic groups), are much more involved than their non-leakage counter-
parts, and more importantly, not yet quite eﬃcient to be used in practice.
A rough estimation of the eﬃciency of current leakage-resilient schemes
is that they are a linear number of times in the security parameter slower
than their non-leakage counterparts. In this work we aim at building an
eﬃcient signature scheme secure against continual leakage. To this aim,
we use an idealized model of computation called generic bilinear group
(GBG) model, which has been previously used by Kiltz and Pietrzak [15]
to provide leakage-resilient public key encryption. They propose a bilinear
version of the ElGamal key encapsulation mechanism which enjoys prov-
able leakage-resilience in the presence of continual leakage. Their scheme is
very eﬃcient, less than a handful of times slower than standard ElGamal.
We use the techniques by Kiltz and Pietrzak to propose a leakage-
resilient signature scheme that builds upon the Boneh-Boyen identity-
based encryption scheme [2]. The resulting signature scheme is nearly as
eﬃcient as the original identity-based encryption scheme (only 43 times
slower). Our main theorem (Theorem 2) states that allowing λ bits of
leakage at every round decreases the security of the scheme by at most a
factor 22λ.
The main criticism that can be addressed to our work is the use of the
generic group idealization to reason about side-channel attacks. The main
question is whether the generic group model is a risky abstraction when
side-channel attacks are considered. The main advantage of our chosen
approach lies on its practicality: the schemes obtained are of eﬃciency
comparable to traditional schemes, a major argument in our opinion to
motivate the cryptographic engineering community's interest. This alone
justiﬁes in our view a careful consideration of this approach to reason
about leakage-resilient schemes, since this level of practicality is still out of
reach for the existing leakage-resilient schemes in the standard model. We
would like to mention that nevertheless, given the breakthroughs achieved
in the last few years in the theory of leakage-resilient cryptography, we
are conﬁdent that the above-mentioned eﬃciency gap will be progressively
shrunk in the years to come and under widely accepted assumptions.
2 Deﬁnitions
In this section, we recollect some basic notions of security of signature
schemes, bilinear groups, and the generic bilinear group model. We also
describe the model of leakage we shall consider in this paper and formulate
a deﬁnition of security of signature schemes in the presence of continual
leakage. We adapt the leakage model speciﬁed in [15] to signature schemes.
Let Z denote the set of integers and Zp (p > 0) denote, depending
upon the context, either the set of integers {0, 1, . . . , p − 1} or the ring
modulo p. We denote a random sampling of an element a ∈ A from a set
A, and also denote a (possibly probabilistic) output of an algorithm A, by
a← A. If we want to explicitly denote the randomness r used during the
sampling/output, then we do so by s
r← S. Unless otherwise mentioned or
implicit from the context, any sampling is from an uniform distribution.
The symbol := is used to deﬁne a notation in an expression, as in A :=
Z, or to explicitly indicate an output of a deterministic algorithm or a
function.
2.1 Existential Unforgeability
A signature scheme Π = (KeyGen,Sign,Verify) consists of three probabilis-
tic polynomial-time algorithms KeyGen, Sign, and Verify. Let κ denote the
security parameter. KeyGen(κ) on input κ produces a public- and secret-
key pair (pk, sk) along with other public parameters PP. The algorithm
Sign(sk,m) on input a secret key sk and a message m ∈ M , where M
is the message space, outputs a signature σ. Verify(pk,m, σ) on input a
public key pk, a message m ∈ M and a signature σ, outputs a bit b = 1
meaning valid, or b = 0 meaning invalid. We require the following correct-
ness requirement to be satisﬁed by Π:
Pr[Verify(pk,m, Sign(sk,m)) = 1 : (pk, sk)← KeyGen(κ),m ∈M ] = 1.
The security of a signature scheme Π is deﬁned through the following
experiment:
Sign-ForgeΠ(A, κ) Sign-Oracle Ωsk(m)
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(κ) w := w ∪m
w := ∅ σ ← Sign(sk,m)
(m,σ)← AΩsk(·)(pk) Return σ
If m ∈ w, then return b := 0
b← Verify(pk,m, σ)
Deﬁnition 1. [Existential Unforgeability] A signature scheme Π is ex-
istentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen-message attacks, in short
secure, if Pr [b = 1] is negligible in the Experiment Sign-ForgeΠ(A, κ)
for any eﬃcient adversary A.
2.2 Leakage Model
We split the secret state into two parts that reside in diﬀerent parts of
the memory, and structure any computation that involves access to the
secret state into a sequence of steps. Any step accesses only one part of
the secret state (active part) and the other part (passive part) is assumed
not to leak in the current step of computation. In the case of signature
schemes, we structure the signing process into two steps. For simplicity, we
deﬁne a security notion for leakage-resilient signature schemes assuming
that the signing process is carried out in two steps. We also refer to a
single invocation of the signature generation algorithm as a round.
Let us consider the problem of achieving leakage resilience under con-
tinual leakage even when a signiﬁcant fraction of the bits of the secret
state are leaked per round. Then it is necessary that the secret state must
be stateful, i.e. the secret state must be refreshed during every round [15].
Otherwise, after many rounds the entire secret state will be completely
leaked.
Formally, a stateful signature scheme Π∗ = (KeyGen∗, Sign∗1, Sign
∗
2,
Verify∗) consists of four probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms KeyGen∗,
Sign∗1, Sign
∗
2 and Verify
∗. KeyGen∗(κ) is same as the set-up phase KeyGen
of Π except that instead of a single secret key sk, it outputs two initial
secret states (S0, S
′
0). Intuitively, S0 and S
′
0 may be viewed as two shares
of the secret key sk. From the point of view of an adversary, the signing
algorithm Sign of Π and (Sign∗1,Sign
∗
2) have the same functionality. First,
Sign∗1 is executed and later Sign
∗
2 is executed. That is, the i
th execution of
the signing process (or ith round) is carried out as:
(Si, wi)
ri← Sign∗1(Si−1,mi) ; (S′i, σi)
r′i← Sign∗2(S′i−1, wi). (1)
In the above expression, ri and r
′
i are the randomness used by Sign
∗
1 and
Sign∗2, respectively. The parameter wi is some state information passed
onto Sign∗2 by Sign
∗
1. The signature σi is generated for the message mi,
and the internal state is updated from (Si−1, S′i−1) to (Si, S
′
i).
We model the leakage during signature generation by giving an adver-
sary A access to a leakage oracle Ωleak(Si−1,S′i−1)(·). This oracle, in addition
to giving A signatures for the messages of its choice, also allows A to
obtain leakage from the computation used to generate signatures. More
precisely, let λ be a leakage parameter. During the ith signing round, A is
allowed to specify two functions fi and hi, each of range {0, 1}λ, that can
be eﬃciently computed. The outputs of the leakage functions are
Λi = fi(Si−1, ri) ; Λ′i = hi(S
′
i−1, r
′
i, wi). (2)
Since the value of m can be included in the description of fi and hi, hence
it is not explicitly included as an input. Note that it also possible for A
to specify hi after obtaining Λi. But, for the simplicity of the exposition,
we focus on the case where fi and hi are speciﬁed along with the mes-
sage mi to the oracle. The security of the signature scheme Π
∗ in the
presence of (continual) leakage is deﬁned through the following experi-
ment Sign-Forge-LeakΠ∗(A, κ, λ). In the description below, |fi| refers to
the length of the output of fi.
Sign-Forge-LeakΠ∗(A, κ, λ) Sign-Leak-Oracle Ωleak(Si−1,S′i−1)(mi, fi, hi)
(pk, (S0, S
′
0))← KeyGen∗(κ) If |fi| 6= λ or |hi| 6= λ, return ⊥
i := 1, w := ∅ (Si, wi) ri← Sign∗1(Si−1,mi)
(m,σ)← AΩ
leak
(Si−1,S′i−1)
(·)
(pk) (S′i, σi)
r′i← Sign∗2(S′i−1, wi)
If m ∈ w, then return b := 0 Λi := fi(Si−1, ri)
b← Verify∗(pk,m, σ) Λ′i := hi(S′i−1, r′i, wi)
i := i+ 1
w := w ∪mi
Return (σi, Λi, Λ
′
i)
Deﬁnition 2. [Existential Unforgeability with Leakage] A signature sch-
eme Π∗ is existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen-message at-
tacks in the presence of (continual) leakage if Pr [b = 1] is negligible in
the Experiment Sign-Forge-LeakΠ∗(A, κ, λ) for any eﬃcient adversary A.
2.3 Bilinear Groups
Let BGen(κ) be a probabilistic bilinear group generator that outputs
(G,GT , p, e, g) such that:
1. G = 〈g〉 and GT are (multiplicatively written) cyclic groups of prime
order p with binary operations · and ?, respectively. The size of p is κ
bits.
2. e : G×G→ GT is a bilinear map that is:
(a) bilinear: ∀u, v ∈ G and ∀a, b ∈ Z, e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab.
(b) non-degenerate: e(g, g) 6= 1.
Such a group G is said to be a bilinear group the above properties hold.
It is also required that the group operations in G and GT , and the map
e are eﬃciently computable. The group G is called as base group and GT
as target group.
2.4 Generic Bilinear Group Model
The generic bilinear group (GBG) model [4] is an extension of the generic
group model [23]. The encodings of the elements of G and GT are given
by random injective maps ξ : Zp → Ξ and ξT : Zp → ΞT , respectively,
where Ξ and ΞT are sets of bit-strings. The group operations in G and
GT , and evaluation of the bilinear map e are performed by three public
oracles O, OT and Oe, respectively, deﬁned as follows. For all a, b ∈ Zp
 O(ξ(a), ξ(b)) := ξ(a+ bmod p)
 OT (ξT (a), ξT (b)) := ξT (a+ bmod p)
 Oe(ξ(a), ξ(b)) := ξT (abmod p)
We assume that Ξ∩ΞT = φ, the (ﬁxed) generator g of G satisﬁes g = ξ(1),
and also the (ﬁxed) generator gT of GT satisﬁes gT = e(g, g) = ξT (1).
2.5 Min-Entropy
Let X be a ﬁnite random variable with a probability distribution Pr.
The min-entropy of X, denoted H∞(X), is deﬁned as H∞(X) := − log2(
max
x
Pr[X = x]
)
. Min-entropy is a standard measure of the worst-case
predictability of a random variable. Let Z be a random variable. The
average conditional min-entropy of X given Z, denoted H˜∞(X |Z), is
deﬁned as
H˜∞(X |Z) := − log2
(
E
z←Z
[
max
x
Pr[X = x |Z = z]
])
.
Average conditional min-entropy is a measure of the worst-case predictabil-
ity of a random variable given a correlated random variable. The following
result is due to [9].
Lemma 1. Let f : X → {0, 1}λ′ be a function on X. Then H˜∞(X | f(X))
≥ H∞(X)− λ′.
The following result is a simple variant of the Schwartz-Zippel Lemma
[22,24].
Lemma 2. [Schwartz-Zippel; min-entropy version] Let F ∈ Zp[X1, . . . ,
Xn] be a non-zero polynomial of (total) degree at most d. Let Pi (i =
1, . . . , n) be probability distributions on Zp such that H∞(Pi) ≥ log p−λ′,
where 0 ≤ λ′ ≤ log p. If xi Pi← Zp (i = 1, . . . , n) are chosen independently,
then Pr[F (x1, . . . , xn) = 0] ≤ 2λ′ d
p
.
Proof. We prove the result by induction. When n = 1, the univariate
polynomial F has at most d roots. Since H∞(P1) ≥ log p − λ′, we have
Pr[F (x1) = 0] ≤ d 2−(log p−λ′) = dp 2λ
′
.
Let us now prove the result for the n-variables case assuming the
result for the (n− 1)-variables case. On writing F as a polynomial in X1
with coeﬃcients in Zp[X2, . . . , Xn], let i (i ≥ 1) be the degree of X1 in
the leading term and F ′ ∈ Zp[X2, . . . , Xn] be the leading coeﬃcient. The
probability
Pr[F (x1, . . . , xn) = 0] ≤ Pr[F (x1, . . . , xn) = 0 |F ′(x2, . . . , xn) 6= 0]
+ Pr[F ′(x2, . . . , xn) = 0].
F ′ is now a non-zero polynomial, of degree at most d − i, in only n −
1 variables. By induction hypothesis we have Pr[F ′(x2, . . . , xn) = 0] ≤
d−i
p 2
λ′ . When F ′(x2, . . . , xn) 6= 0, we have Pr[F (x1, . . . , xn) = 0] ≤ ip 2λ
′
because degree of F in X1 is i (i ≥ 1) and the distributions Pi (i =
1, . . . , n) are independent. Hence Pr[F (x1, . . . , xn) = 0] ≤ dp 2λ
′
. Note
that the parameter n does not appear in the above bound. uunionsq
Corollary 1. If λ′ = (1− ) log p (for constant  > 0) in Lemma 2, then
Pr[F (x1, . . . , xn) = 0] is negligible (in log p).
3 Basic Signature Scheme
We now describe a signature scheme that is obtained from the Boneh-
Boyen identity based encryption scheme (BB-IBE) [2]. This scheme is not
yet known to be existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen-message
attacks (EUF-CMA) in the standard model. However, we are able to prove
that the BB-signature scheme is EUF-CMA secure in the GBG model.
Let ΠBB = (KeyGenBB,SignBB,VerifyBB) be a signature scheme on the
message space Zp deﬁned as follows:
1. KeyGenBB(κ): Compute PP := (G,GT , p, e, g) ← BGen(κ). Choose
random x, x0, x1 ← Zp. Set X := gx, X0 := gx0 , X1 := gx1 and
XT := e(g,X) = e(g, g)
x. The public key is pk := (PP, X0, X1, XT )
and the secret key is sk := X.
2. SignBB(sk,m): Choose a random t← Zp. Set σ := (sk ·(X0 ·Xm1 )t, gt).
Output the signature σ.
3. VerifyBB(pk,m, σ): Let σ = (σ1, σ2) ∈ G2. Output the bit b = 1 (valid)
if XT ? e(σ2, X0 ·Xm1 ) = e(σ1, g). Otherwise output b = 0 (invalid).
Theorem 1. The signature scheme ΠBB is EUF-CMA secure in the gene-
ric bilinear group model.
Proof. Let A be a q-query adversary that can break the security of ΠBB.
By a q-query adversary we mean that A can make totally at most q group
oracle and signing oracle queries. Let qO be the total number of calls to
the group oracles O, OT and Oe, and qΩ correspond to the number of
calls to the signing oracle. We have qO + qΩ ≤ q. As is typical for proofs
in the generic group model, we bound the advantage of A against ΠBB
by the success probability of A in the following game G (see [23,19,3]). A
plays the game G with an algorithm B.
Game G : Let X, X0, X1, {Ti : 1 ≤ i ≤ qΩ}, {Ui : 1 ≤ i ≤ qg, 0 ≤ qg ≤
2(qO + 1)} and {Vi : 1 ≤ i ≤ qgT , 0 ≤ qgT ≤ 2qO} be indeterminates,
and {mi : 1 ≤ i ≤ qΩ} be elements of Zp chosen by A. Intuitively, these
indeterminates correspond to randomly chosen group elements in ΠBB, or
more precisely their discrete logarithms. The indeterminates X, X0, X1
correspond to the quantities x, x0, x1, respectively. Note that A might
query the group oracles with representations (bit-strings) not previously
obtained from the group oracles. In order to accommodate this case we
introduce the indeterminates Ui, Vi. The Ui (1 ≤ i ≤ qg) correspond to
the elements of G, whereas Vi (1 ≤ i ≤ qgT ) correspond to the elements
of GT . We denote the lists {Ti : 1 ≤ i ≤ qΩ}, {Ui : 1 ≤ i ≤ qg} and
{Vi : 1 ≤ i ≤ qgT } by {T}, {U} and {V }, respectively.
B maintains two lists of pairs
L = {(F1,i , ξ1,i) : 1 ≤ i ≤ τ1}, (3)
LT = {(FT,i , ξT,i) : 1 ≤ i ≤ τT }, (4)
such that, at step τ (0 ≤ τ ≤ qO) in the game,
τ1 + τT = τ + 2qΩ + qg + qgT + 4. (5)
The entries F1,i ∈ Zp[X,X0, X1, {U}, {T}], FT,i ∈ Zp[X,X0, X1, {U}, {V },
{T}] are multivariate polynomials over Zp, whereas ξ1,i, ξT,i are bit-strings
in the encoding sets Ξ (of G) and ΞT (of GT ), respectively. Intuitively,
the polynomials in lists L and LT correspond to elements of G and GT ,
respectively, that A will ever be able to compute or guess. In order to
simplify the description, we view Zp[X,X0, X1, {U}, {T}] as a subring of
Zp[X,X0, X1, {U}, {V }, {T}].
Initially, τ = 0, τ1 = 2qΩ + qg + 3, τT = qgT + 1,
L = { (1, ξ1,1), (X0, ξ1,2), (X1, ξ1,3), {(Ui, ξ1,i+3) : 1 ≤ i ≤ qg},
{(X + (X0 +miX1)Ti, ξ1,2i+qg+2), (Ti, ξ1,2i+qg+3) : 1 ≤ i ≤ qΩ}
}
,
LT = { X, {(Vi, ξT,i+1) : 1 ≤ i ≤ qgT } } .
The bit-strings ξ1,i, ξT,i are set to random distinct strings from Ξ and ΞT ,
respectively. We assume that there is some ordering (say, lexicographic
ordering) among the strings in the sets Ξ and ΞT , so that given a string
ξ1,i or ξT,i, it is possible to determine its index in the lists, if it exits.
The initial state of the two lists correspond to the group elements
that A gets as input as part of the public parameters and the signatures
obtained by A on the messages mi of its choice. As previously mentioned,
the polynomials Ui, Vi correspond to the group elements that A will guess
in the actual interaction. Since A can query the group oracles with at most
two new (guessed) elements and since it may also output at most two new
elements from G as its forgery, we have qg+ qgT ≤ 2qO+2. Hence (5) can
be simpliﬁed as (assuming qΩ ≥ 6, without loss of generality)
τ1 + τT ≤ qO + 2qΩ + 2qO + 2 + 4 ≤ 3(qO + qΩ) ≤ 3q. (6)
The game begins by B providing A with the initial τ1 strings ξ1,1, . . .,
ξ1,τ1 from L, and τT strings ξT,1, . . ., ξT,τT from LT .
Group operation: The calls made by A to the group oracles O and
OT are modeled as follows. For group operations in G, A provides B
with two operands (bit-strings) ξ1,i, ξ1,j (1 ≤ i, j ≤ τ1) in L and also
speciﬁes whether to multiply or divide them. B answers the query by ﬁrst
incrementing the counters τ1 := τ1 + 1 and τ := τ + 1, and provides A
with the polynomial F1,τ1 := F1,i ± F1,j . If F1,τ1 = F1,k for some k < τ1,
then B sets ξ1,τ1 := ξ1,k. Otherwise, ξ1,τ1 is set to a random string distinct
from those already present in L. Also the pair (F1,τ1 , ξ1,τ1) is appended to
L. Note that the (total) degree of the polynomials F1,i in L is at most two.
Similarly, group operations in GT are answered, appropriately updating
the list LT and the counters τT and τ .
Pairing: For a pairing operation, A queries B with two operands ξ1,i, ξ1,j
(1 ≤ i, j ≤ τ1) in L. B ﬁrst increments τT := τT + 1 and τ := τ + 1, and
then computes the polynomial FT,τT := F1,i · F1,j . Again, if FT,τ1 = FT,k
for some k < τT , then B sets ξT,τT := ξT,k. Otherwise, ξT,τT is set to a
random string distinct from those already present in LT . Also the pair
(FT,τT , ξT,τT ) is appended to LT . The degree of the polynomials FT,i in
LT is at most four.
When A terminates it outputs (m, (ξ1,α1 , ξ1,α2)) ∈ Zp × L × L (1 ≤
α1, α2 ≤ τ1). This corresponds to the forgery output by A in the ac-
tual interaction. Let the polynomials corresponding to ξ1,α1 and ξ1,α2 in
L be F1,α1 and F1,α2 , respectively. After A terminates, B computes the
polynomial
F1,σ := X + F1,α2(X0 +mX1)− F1,α1 . (7)
Note that the degree of F1,σ is at most three. Next, B chooses random
values x, x0, x1, {u}, {v}, {t} ← Zp for the indeterminates X, X0, X1,
{U}, {V }, {T}, respectively. Then it evaluates the polynomials in lists L
and LT . A is said to have won the game G if:
1. F1,i(x, x0, x1, {u}, {t}) = F1,j(x, x0, x1, {u}, {t}) in Zp, for some two
polynomials F1,i 6= F1,j in L.
2. FT,i(x, x0, x1, {u}, {v}, {t}) = FT,j(x, x0, x1, {u}, {v}, {t}) in Zp, for
some two polynomials FT,i 6= FT,j in LT .
3. F1,σ(x, x0, x1, {u}, {t}) = 0 in Zp, and m 6= mi ∀i, i = 1, . . . , qΩ.
This completes the description of the game G.
We claim that the success probability of A in the actual EUF-CMA
game is bounded above by its success probability in the above game G.
This is because of the following reasons:
 The conditions 1 and 2 above ensure that A will get to see only distinct
group elements in the actual interaction. In other words, A is unable
to cause collisions among group elements. As long as these two con-
ditions are not satisﬁed, then the view of A is identical in the game G
and the actual interaction. Hence if A is unable to provoke collisions,
then adaptive strategies are no more powerful than non-adaptive ones
(for more details, we refer to [19, Lemma 2 on pp. 12], also [23]).
This observation allows us to choose group elements and their repre-
sentations independently of the strategy of A. Hence A speciﬁed the
messages mi at the beginning of the game G and also obtained the
corresponding signatures. For the same reason, it also decided at the
beginning itself on the representations it would guess. Note that the
assumption that A would a priori decide the representations it would
guess is only to simplify the description of the proof and it is not an
inherent limitation.
 The condition 3 above ensures that the pair (ξ1,α1 , ξ1,α2) is a valid
forgery on a distinct message m.
We now compute the success probability of A in the game G. The τ1
polynomials F1,i in L have degree at most two. Note that F1,i 6= F1,j ⇔
F1,i − F1,j 6= 0 as polynomials. From Lemma 2 (with λ′ = 0), the prob-
ability that two distinct polynomials in L evaluate to the same value for
randomly and independently chosen values for the indeterminates is at
most 2p . Summing up over at most
(
τ1
2
)
distinct pairs (i, j), the probabil-
ity that the condition 1 above holds is at most
(
τ1
2
) · 2p . Similarly, we have
the probability that the condition 2 above holds is at most
(
τ2
2
) · 4p . The
degree of the polynomial F1,σ in condition 3 is at most three. In order
to apply Lemma 2, we need to prove that Fσ is not identically equal to
the zero polynomial. We prove this fact in Lemma 3 below. Let PrforgeA,ΠBB
denote the advantage of the adversary A in computing a forgery against
ΠBB. Then, assuming Lemma 3, we obtain from (6)
PrforgeA,ΠBB ≤
(
τ1
2
)
· 2
p
+
(
τ2
2
)
· 4
p
+
3
p
≤ 2
p
(τ1 + τ2)
2 ≤ 18q
2
p
. (8)
Hence if q = poly(log p), then PrforgeA,ΠBB is negligible.
Lemma 3. The polynomial F1,σ ∈ Zp[X,X0, X1, {U}, {T}] is non-zero.
Proof. Any polynomial in L is obtained by either adding or subtracting
two polynomials previously existing in the list. Hence we can write F1,α1
and F1,α2 in terms of polynomials present in L when it was was initialized
at step τ = 0 in the game G. Note that initially L also includes the
representations guessed by A, in addition to the inputs.
F1,α1 = c1 + c2X0 + c3X1 +
∑qg
i=1 c4,iUi +
∑qΩ
i=1 c5,iTi
+
∑qΩ
i=1 c6,i(X + (X0 +miX1)Ti), (9)
F1,α2 = d1 + d2X0 + d3X1 +
∑qg
i=1 d4,iUi +
∑qΩ
i=1 d5,iTi
+
∑qΩ
i=1 d6,i(X + (X0 +miX1)Ti), (10)
where cj , dj(j = 1, 2, 3), cj,i, dj,i(j = 4, 5, 6; 1 ≤ i ≤ qΩ) ∈ Zp are
chosen by A. We have two possible cases:
Case 1: c6,i = d6,i = 0 ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ qΩ.
In this case, both F1,α1 and F1,α2 do not contain the indeterminate
X. Hence the expression F1,α2(X0 + mX1) − F1,α1 in (7) is free of X.
Therefore, in the polynomial X+F1,α2(X0+mX1)−F1,α1 , the coeﬃcient
of the term X is non-zero. Hence F1,σ is non-zero.
Case 2: c6,k 6= 0 or d6,k 6= 0 for some k, where 1 ≤ k ≤ qΩ.
On substituting expressions from (9) and (10) into (7), we get that
the coeﬃcient of monomials X20Ti, X0Ti, X1Ti in F1,σ are d6,i, d5,i −
c6,i, m d5,i −mic6,i, respectively, for 1 ≤ i ≤ qΩ.
If d6,k 6= 0, then the coeﬃcient of X20Tk is non-zero, and hence F1,σ 6=
0. Else, c6,k 6= 0. We again have two cases: If d5,k 6= c6,k, then the coef-
ﬁcient of X0Tk is non-zero. Or else, if d5,k = c6,k, then the coeﬃcient of
X1Tk is non-zero, since m 6= mi ∀i, i = 1, . . . , qΩ. Hence in all cases we
have F1,σ to be a non-zero polynomial. uunionsq
4 A Leakage-Resilient Signature Scheme
As previously mentioned in Section 2.2, any cryptographic scheme that
does not maintain a stateful secret state is insecure against continual
leakage. So is the case with the signature scheme ΠBB. We now describe a
leakage-resilient version Π∗BB of ΠBB. We follow the techniques of [15] to
adapt ΠBB to a leakage setting. The basic idea is to store the secret key
X = gx in two diﬀerent parts of the memory as (S0 := g
l0 , S′0 := gx−l0)
for a randomly chosen l0 ← Zp. Accordingly, the KeyGenBB step of ΠBB
is modiﬁed to obtain the set-up stage KeyGen∗BB of Π∗BB. The signature
generation is now carried out as a two step process Sign∗BB1 and Sign
∗
BB2.
During the ith signature query, the two parts of the secret key (Si−1, S′i−1)
are refreshed to obtain (Si := Si−1 · gli , S′i := S′i−1 · g−li), where li ← Zp.
This is done in order to protect against continual leakage.
Let Π∗BB = (KeyGen
∗
BB,Sign
∗
BB1, Sign
∗
BB2,Verify
∗
BB) be a stateful signa-
ture scheme on the message space Zp deﬁned as follows:
1. KeyGen∗BB(κ): Compute PP := (G,GT , p, e, g) ← BGen(κ). Choose
random x, x0, x1, l0 ← Zp. Set X := gx, X0 := gx0 , X1 := gx1 and
XT := e(g,X) = e(g, g)
x. The public key is pk := (PP, X0, X1, XT )
and the secret key is sk∗ := (S0 := gl0 , S′0 := gx−l0 = X · g−l0) ∈ G2.
2. Sign∗BB1(Si−1,mi): Choose random ti, li ← Zp. Set Si := Si−1 · gli ,
σ′1,i := Si · (X0 ·Xmi1 )ti , and σ′2,i := gti .
3. Sign∗BB2(S′i−1, (σ
′
1,i, σ
′
2,i, li)): Set S
′
i := S
′
i−1·g−li and σi := (S′i·σ′1,i, σ′2,i).
Output the signature σi.
4. Verify∗BB(pk,m, σ): Let σ = (σ1, σ2) ∈ G2. Output the bit b = 1 (valid)
if XT ? e(σ2, X0 ·Xm1 ) = e(σ1, g). Otherwise output b = 0 (invalid).
In steps 2 and 3 above, the index i keeps a count of the number of invoca-
tions (rounds) of the signing algorithm. For every i ≥ 1, let Yi :=
∑i
j=0 lj .
It is easy to check that Si ·S′i = gYi · gx−Yi = X. We sometimes even refer
to X as the secret key.
Note that Sign∗BB1 requires four exponentiations and Sign
∗
BB2 requires
one. The total number of exponentiations needed for every signature in-
vocation can be reduced from ﬁve to four if Sign∗BB1 also passes on gli to
Sign∗BB2. Hence only one extra exponentiation is needed when compared
with the SignBB step of ΠBB, which requires three.
For the sake of clarity, we would like to compare the various notations
used in the signature scheme Π∗BB above with those in (1) corresponding
to a generic stateful signature scheme Π∗. The quantities ri and wi in (1)
correspond to (li, ti) and (σ
′
1,i, σ
′
2,i, li) of Π
∗
BB, respectively. The quantities
Si, S
′
i andmi denote the same things in both the cases. However, since the
algorithm Sign∗BB2 of Π∗BB does not generate any randomness, there is no
analogue in Π∗BB for r
′
i of (1). Accordingly, the leakage functions speciﬁed
by an adversary to the signing oracle Ωleak(Si−1,S′i−1)
(mi, fi, hi) would be of
the form f i(Si−1, (li, ti)) and hi(S′i−1, (σ
′
1,i, σ
′
2,i, li)).
First we show that Π∗BB is secure in the GBG model when an adver-
sary is not allowed to obtain leakage. The following lemma is a trivial
consequence of the fact that the input/output behaviour of Π∗BB and ΠBB
are identical (c.f. Theorem 1).
Lemma 4. The signature scheme Π∗BB is EUF-CMA secure in the generic
bilinear group model.
The following theorem establishes the fact that the signature scheme Π∗BB
is resilient to (continual) leakage attacks in the GBG model if λ  log p2 ,
where λ is the leakage parameter.
Theorem 2. The signature scheme Π∗BB is secure with leakage w.r.t. Def-
inition 2 in the generic bilinear group model. The advantage of a q-query
adversary who gets at most λ bits of leakage per each invocation of Sign∗BB1
or Sign∗BB2 is O
(
q2
p 2
2λ
)
.
Proof. Let A be a q-query adversary that can break the security of Π∗BB.
By a q-query adversary A we mean that A can make totally at most q
group oracle and signing oracle queries. Let qO be the total number of calls
to the group oracles O, OT and Oe, and qΩ correspond to the number of
calls to the signing oracle. We have qO + qΩ ≤ q. In the count qO, even
the group oracle queries by leakage functions f i, hi speciﬁed by A are also
included.
We ﬁrst informally sketch the main ideas of the proof and then formal-
ize these ideas. Let us try to see why the proof of security of Π∗BB in the
absence of any leakage (i.e. proof of Theorem 1) would not carry over as it
is in the presence of leakage. In the non-leakage setting, while determin-
ing the probability of collision among distinct polynomials in conditions
1-3 on page 10, we substituted for each indeterminate an independent
value chosen from an uniform distribution over Zp. But, when A has ac-
cess to leakage functions f i(Si−1, (li, ti)) and hi(S′i−1, (σ
′
1,i, σ
′
2,i, li)), then
from its point of view the parameters ti (1 ≤ i ≤ qΩ) are no longer uni-
formly distributed (though they are still independent). With some partial
information about ti, A can now cause collisions among polynomials with
increased probability. Since each ti is chosen independently and it can be
leaked by only fi, hence at most λ bits of ti can be leaked. Apart from the
values ti, the only other useful information that leakage functions can
provide is about the secret key X = gx. This is because the parameters li
themselves alone do not help A to output forgery since the signatures gen-
erated are independent of these randomly chosen values. Instead, A can
very much use the leakages of li to compute, and eventually leak, the se-
cret key X. Note that the leakage functions do not provide any additional
information on the values x, x0 or x1.
We ﬁrst bound the probability of the event that the secret key X is
computed by some leakage function f i or hi. As long as this event has not
occurred, then no bits of the secret key is leaked and the only additional
information A has is about the values ti. Clearly, the probability of this
event depends on the leakage parameter λ. For instance, if the amount
of leakage per invocation is not bounded, then during the ﬁrst signature
query itself, the adversary can leak the initial two shares of the secret key
S0 = g
l0 and S′0 = X · g−l0 to recompute X. Finally, we determine the
advantage of A conditioned on the event of the secret key X not being
computed by any of the leakage functions.
Formally, we deﬁne E to be the event of computing (or guessing) the
secret key X = gx by any of the leakage functions f i or hi (1 ≤ i ≤ qΩ).
Let E denote the complement of the event E, Forgery denote the event
of A forging a signature on a new message, and PrforgeA,Π∗BB = Pr[Forgery]
denote the advantage of A in computing a forgery against Π∗BB. We have
PrforgeA,Π∗BB = Pr[Forgery|E]Pr[E] + Pr[Forgery|E]Pr[E].
Since Pr[Forgery|E], Pr[E] ≤ 1, we obtain
PrforgeA,Π∗BB ≤ Pr[E] + Pr[Forgery|E]. (11)
We ﬁrst bound the probability of the event E.
Lemma 5. Pr[E] ≤ O
(
q2
p 2
2λ
)
.
Proof. Let the adversary A play the following game G′. Since the game
G′ is similar in nature to the game G in the proof of Theorem 1, we only
brieﬂy describe G′. We use the notations introduced in the game G. Let
{L} denote the list of indeterminates {Li : 1 ≤ i ≤ qΩ} that correspond
to the values li in Π
∗
BB.
Game G′: For every leakage function f i(Si−1, (li, ti)) and hi(S′i−1, (σ′1,i,
σ′2,i, li)), A builds lists Lfi and Lhi , respectively. These lists contain poly-
nomial-bit string pairs. The polynomials are from Zp[X,X0, X1, {U}, {T},
{L}] and the bit-strings are from the encoding set Ξ of the group G. In-
tuitively, the polynomials in lists Lfi and Lhi correspond to the elements
of group G that can be computed by fi and hi, respectively. Every poly-
nomial in Lfi is of the form
c1,iLi + c2,i
i−1∑
j=0
Lj + c3,iDi, (12)
where c1,i, c2,i, c3,i ∈ Zp are chosen by A and Di ∈ Zp[X,X0, X1, {U},
{T}] is in the list L (c.f. (3)). Every polynomial in Lhi is of the form
d1,iLi+d2,i
X − i−1∑
j=0
Lj
+d3,i
 i∑
j=0
Lj
+ (X0 +miX1)Ti
+d4,iWi,
(13)
where d1,i, d2,i, d3,i, d4,i, mi ∈ Zp are also chosen by A and Wi ∈ Zp[X,
X0, X1, {U}, {T}] is in the list L.
When A terminates it outputs a polynomial F from the list Lfi or
Lhi , for some i. Intuitively, the polynomial F output by A corresponds to
its guess of the secret key X. A is said to have won the game G′ if
1. There is a collision in any of the lists Lfi and Lhi , for some i (1 ≤ i ≤
qΩ).
2. F −X = 0 in Zp.
Note that the polynomials are now evaluated with values chosen from
independent distributions with min-entropy log p − 2λ. The reason for
this will be shortly explained. This completes the description of the game
G′.
Technically speaking, A must also maintain lists LfiT and LhiT (1 ≤ i ≤
qΩ) that correspond to elements of the group GT that can be computed
by fi and hi. To simplify the discussion, we only describe collisions in
the lists Lfi and Lhi . Similar arguments apply for the lists LfiT and LhiT .
Since we compute Pr[E] only up to a constant factor, the additional ad-
vantage A obtains from collisions in LfiT and LhiT is implicitly included.
However, working on the lines of the proof of Theorem 1, it is relatively
straightforward to completely formalize the present discussion.
For similar reasons as given in the proof of Theorem 1, we have Pr[E]
is bounded above by the success probability of A in the above game G′.
We particularly like to note the following. As observed in [1, pp. 691] and
the references therein, even in the leakage setting adaptive strategies are
no more powerful than non-adaptive ones.
Before computing the success probability of A, we ﬁrst show that
F − X is a non-zero polynomial. From Lemma 4 and Theorem 1, we
know that Π∗BB is secure without leakage. Hence the polynomial X (that
corresponds to the secret key) cannot appear in the list L, because this
would otherwise imply that the secret key can be computed without access
to leakage functions. A formal proof for this fact can be easily obtained
on the lines of the proof of Lemma 3. Hence even when c1,i = c2,i = 0 in
(12), the lists Lfi cannot contain the polynomial X. If c1,i 6= 0 or c2,i 6= 0,
then the polynomial in (12) will contain either Li or Li−1, or both. Hence
the polynomial X cannot appear in any of the lists Lfi . In a similar way
it can be seen that the lists Lhi do not contain X. Hence F − X is a
non-zero polynomial of degree at most two.
Let us now determine the probability that the condition 1 above holds,
i.e. the probability of collisions among distinct polynomials in any of the
lists Lfi and Lhi . In order to compute the probability, we evaluate the
polynomials in (12) and (13) by choosing values from Zp according to
(independent) distributions with min-entropy at least log p − 2λ. This is
because A can obtain at most 2λ bits of leakage about li (i = 0, . . . , qΩ),
and at most λ bits of ti (i = 1, . . . , qΩ). From Lemma 1, the values li, ti
have min-entropy at least log p − 2λ in the view of A. The total length
of the lists Lfi , Lhi is at most O(qΩ + qO) = O(q). Hence there can
be at most O(q2) pairs of distinct polynomials (of degree at most two)
evaluating to the same value. From Lemma 2 (with λ′ = 2λ), we obtain
Pr[E] ≤ O
(
q2
p 2
2λ
)
. Since F − X is a non-zero polynomial of degree at
most two, the probability that F −X evaluates to zero is at most 2p22λ.
This probability is also implicitly included in the above bound. uunionsq
We now determine the probability Pr[Forgery |E] in (11).
Lemma 6. Pr[Forgery |E] ≤ 18q
2
p
2λ.
Proof. Given that the event E has not occurred, the only meaningful
leakage A can now obtain is that of ti (i = 1, . . . , qΩ). Since at most λ
bits of ti can leak (only by fi), from the view point of A the values ti
have min-entropy at least log p − λ. From Lemma 2 (with λ′ = λ), the
probability of collision among distinct polynomials in conditions 1-3 on
page 10 is now increased by a factor of 2λ. Hence, from (8), we obtain
Pr[Forgery |E] ≤ 18q2p 2λ. uunionsq
From (11) and Lemmas 5 and 6, we have PrforgeA,Π∗BB ≤ O
(
q2
p
22λ
)
. This
completes the proof of Theorem 2. uunionsq
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